The United States is offering a $50 million reward for the capture of Venezuela's illegitimate president...
What's the problem with the US? It's that it's increasingly becoming a
"banana republic," meaning everything is so well-oiled and organized that
people are starting to relax, lose their composure, and think that "since
our courts and rewards work, it must work everywhere else." But that's
absolutely not true.
How do you imagine someone "getting the president out of the country"? A man
with a personal printing press (he can print as much money as he wants), a
private army, and no security problems?
Even if there are people willing to kill Maduro, not just oust him (which is
much simpler and more realistic), where is the guarantee that the US won't
screw them over? Bribes exist in the US too – where is the guarantee that a US
government official won't leak the killer's details? There are no guarantees.
The US is a people country. People don't like to pay. If given the
opportunity, they'll start looking for ways (legal and otherwise) to avoid
paying what they promised, as is usually the case.
Therefore, such a $50 million reward is nothing more than a joke. It will
never be implemented.
The same goes for an international court – what's the point if the country's
president can freely evade it (like Moscow's Putin) and can't bring any claims
against the entire country or punish it in any way.
A single public figure is a weak link susceptible to strong influence, often
corrupted—this is the root cause of most of the problems in modern society. A
computer system controlled by a huge number of anonymous (protected)
individuals lacks such weaknesses. You can't bribe such a system, and you
can't influence it even with a huge amount of money. Examples like Bitcoin and
torrents show that by transferring such a system to a decentralized
blockchain, it can be made extremely resistant to destruction.
A large bounty hunter reward is much more effective than an "international
manhunt," which is not so difficult to escape.
It's high time to create a decentralized blockchain service where defrauded
people anywhere in the world could chip in cryptocurrency to shut down a local
illegitimate scam. So that the entire planet would be racing to find him
(making it impossible for him to pay off or escape). So that his family
members would be taken hostage and exchanged for him (as the intelligence
agencies themselves do).
When the system described in the article is launched, there will be mass
assassination attempts on illegitimate governors, various riff-raff (like
the Muscovite-appointed leader of the DPR), illegitimate court officials,
and so on. People agree to murder even for a few million, and for tens or
hundreds of millions, they will tear any single person to pieces, and no
security will save them.
This will happen en masse if there's a rock-solid guarantee of payment (and not just "Trump's promises" — maybe I'll pay, maybe I'll scam). When the target (the illegitimate official) can't "bribe" anyone to cover their own ass.
A SUPERWEAPON FOR DEMOCRACY
Western countries have much stronger and more efficient economies (the
population's solvency is much higher), and at the same time, there are no
permanent leaders — they have more honest and transparent elections and a
rotation of power.
In anti-democratic countries, it's just the opposite: a weak, perpetually poor
economy and lifelong rulers who rig elections. Therefore, it's easy to rig the
system so that undemocratic regimes are always targeted, while individuals in
democratic countries are always safe.
The system will also prevent a single, deep-pocketed individual from "ordering
hits on any competitor they don't like." It will only apply to illegitimate
presidents, governors, and heads of the military, intelligence agencies,
police, courts, and prosecutors.
The system will function as a supplement to the
electronic voting system, which is extremely difficult to counterfeit or copy.
BRIEF ALGORITHM OF THE SYSTEM'S OPERATION
Voting is conducted through an unforgeable electronic voting system. The
president, governor, chief of police, intelligence agency, court, and
prosecutor's office are elected. If the true winner is prevented from taking
their rightful seat (the seat remains held by someone other than the one with
the majority, i.e., an illegitimate official), people contribute
cryptocurrency into a special wallet, from which payment is made for the
physical elimination of the illegitimate official.
The system is not inherently complex, but it is thoroughly thought out and
protected from hacking and potential fraud. Once launched, the system should
be extremely effective.
KEY FEATURE OF THE SYSTEM
The key feature of the system is the guaranteed payment to the hitman,
deposited into a secure crypto wallet. Their identity remains unknown to the
public, and they receive a substantial reward while remaining safe. The hitman
will know in advance that their payment is guaranteed, and it won't depend on
individual (and therefore unreliable) promises. There will be no "maybe
they'll pay, maybe they'll screw you over." They will always have a guaranteed
reward for the completed mission. Even the US, with its $50 million bounty on
Maduro's head, can't offer this today.
It's also important that there will be no illegitimate goals; the system will
always work only against illegitimate officials (those who have seized power).
That is, its use will always be justified by society — it will always act in
its interests, without endangering outsiders.
JURIES RULE THE SYSTEM
Even in the future, it's unlikely that a neural network will be able to make
an accurate decision in our system, so the system will rely on the decisions
of human jurors. There will be a large number of jurors, they will be
anonymous, and they will always be aggressively opposed to the target (the
illegitimate official). In turn, the illegitimate official will be
aggressively opposed to the jurors, making it quite difficult for them to
bribe them.
First, a vote is held via an
electronic voting system. If the winner is an individual who is prevented from taking office by
another illegitimate official (who refuses to recognize the election), then
interested parties contribute to a common fund (via cryptocurrency or other
available means) "for the elimination of the illegitimate criminal official."
Moreover, to protect against fraud, jurors — citizens who have not made any
contributions — will decide whether the target has actually been eliminated
and who should receive compensation. These jurors, numbering 5,000-100,000
(the more the better), will be selected from among those who voted in previous
elections for the winner, the person with the most votes — that is, the one
who should actually take over the position of the current fraudulent official.
In this case, the jury will be highly motivated to reach a precise decision
that is not favorable to the current fraudulent official. But it will also be
unfavorable to those who contributed (because it's in their interests to chip
in, eliminate the target, and then avoid paying the hitman and get their money
back). The hitman will always receive his reward.
These measures will create serious protection against fraud (for example, when
a fraudulent official makes contributions himself in order to cover his tracks
and then transfer the money to his own proxy).
NUANCES:
*) If possible, the system should select jurors from among those who have
voted for the winner several times (i.e., so that the citizen is a strong,
stable supporter of the given person).
*) The system does not publish the personal data of jurors; all of it remains
as anonymous as possible (and therefore protected).
*) Some jurors (at random) may receive a small reward for their work (it is
taken from a common pot), but the reward is paid only if their decision
coincides with the decision of the majority of jurors (this encourages them to
make the most accurate and balanced decisions).
*) If a juror experiences internet problems (this can happen in undemocratic
dumps), the juror can appoint a person in advance to vote in his place.
THE NUANCES OF A KILLER'S WORK
*) The killer makes a deposit (0.05% of the total reward) one week before the
target's assassination. They then assassinate the target within one week. The
target will always be publicly visible, so if the assassination is successful,
they will no longer be seen publicly. Additionally, the killer can provide
proof of the target's death.
*) If a fraudulent official suddenly appears, and the killer turns out to be a
fraudster, then he loses the deposit without having time to receive any part
of the reward.
*) After the liquidation of a target for protection, the reward to the killer
is not paid out immediately, but begins to be paid out after six months in
equal parts over 5-10 years (the period depends on the amount collected).
*) If the killer turns out to be a fraud after some time (an illegitimate
official shows up), then he loses the deposit, and the remaining funds are
transferred back to the potential reward for a new real killer.
*) The killer is also allowed to damage the health of the target and his
relatives - the goal is to use any means necessary to ensure that the
illegitimate fraudulent official loses his seat and it goes to the one for
whom the people actually voted.
*) If a killer, using various tricks, forces a fraudulent official to resign
from his post and announces the exact date of his resignation in advance (more
precisely than all other potential killers), he receives a reward.
*) If there are applications from several killers, the winner is the one who
agrees to eliminate the target for the smallest reward (he can specify this in
advance) and who more accurately specifies the time from which the target will
disappear from public appearances.
*) The deposit must be of such a size that its loss would be noticeable (to
protect against fake killers and a lot of fake applications).
*) The parameters "one week before liquidation", "more precise amount of
bail", "time after which payments to the killer begin and the period during
which they are paid" - can be varied depending on the current situation.
*) The terms "killer" and "liquidate" should not be used in the system. The
terms "elimination of an illegitimate fraudster" should be used to avoid the
appearance of a crime.
HOW CAN SOCIETY BE SURE THAT THE SYSTEM IS GUARANTEED TO PAY KILLERS FOR
THE LIQUIDATION OF FRAUDULENT OFFICIALS?
The killer submits a request to the system along the following lines: "From
such-and-such a date (the most precise time), the target will no longer appear
in public. For completing the job, please transfer the reward to the specified
crypto wallet (one or more)." This message is encrypted with a specific cipher
(code word) and is displayed publicly in encrypted form.
Three years after the target's assassination (when the target has completely
disappeared from public view), the system publishes a code word that can be
used to decode requests from all potential assassins and from the assassin who
carried out the mission. This way, the entire world can verify that the
specified wallet is indeed the assassin's.
To prevent the target from detecting the killer's hunt in advance from the
coded message and from "laying low for a week," the system must generate decoy
(garbage) coded messages every week that will constantly confuse the victim.
After three years, the code words for all of these messages must also be
published.
For additional protection, the killer can specify several crypto wallets to
which the system will distribute the reward in turn, according to a formula:
the first three years' payments are made to the first crypto wallet, the next
three years to the second, and so on. The system also encodes the numbers of
the additional wallets with code words and publishes the decryption keys only
after every three years. This is necessary to ensure the killer has more
security and time to withdraw all funds from the old wallet (to cover their
tracks).
SCENARIO: ROGUE OFFICIAL AGREES TO PUBLIC PEACEFUL RESIGNATION
If the target is publicly removed from office and publicly transferred to the
person who actually received the most votes, the jury removes the bounty. All
funds from the bounty are placed in the vault of the given region (or
country). And at the next election, when the "eliminate fraudulent official"
function is reactivated, 30-100% of these funds are immediately added to the
general pool. There is also an option: if the fraudulent official voluntarily
resigns, the bounty is frozen for three years and then returned to all donors.
But here a situation may arise where, if there are a significant number of
donors on the jury, they will be incentivized to choose the "return the money
to the donors because the fraudulent official allegedly resigned" scenario,
even if the official is eliminated by a hitman. This means they may not be
paid.
In general, the first option should be initially considered, but then the
second can be carefully and occasionally allowed, and the statistics of the
final decisions can be monitored.
SCENARIO: A ROGUE OFFICIAL SUDDENLY DISAPPEARS FROM VIEW
If a fraudulent official suddenly disappears from view for a long time, but no
liquidation request has been received from the killers, the money remains in
the system for at least three years and is returned to all who contributed (in
the same amount), minus the jury fee.
The jury decides whether to return the funds. They may extend the retention
period if there are specific grounds for doing so.
SCENARIO: A ROGUE OFFICIAL HAS DISAPPEARED, OR HAS HANDED OVER HIS CHAIR TO
ANOTHER OFFICIAL NOT ELECTED BY THE POPULATION
In such a case, the target for elimination becomes a new, illegitimate,
fraudulent official. This continues until the position is occupied by someone
elected by the people.
SCENARIO: A FRAUDULENT OFFICIAL CANNOT BE LIQUIDATED FOR 20 YEARS
The killer's reward money is accumulated in a common pot, and new sums are
added to it annually, making the target's elimination increasingly more
profitable.
In this case, only the original jurors must be used; new elections are blocked
until the fraudulent official is eliminated - so that the target cannot
install fake, paid jurors in one of the new elections (i.e., a vote held after
the hunt for his head has begun).
The person who is actually destined to occupy the official's seat (the winner
of the vote) has the right to immediately appoint a successor, a replacement
in case something happens to them (and the successor can appoint their own
successor). This is necessary to avoid additional votes until the fraudulent
official is eliminated. In other words, to protect the official's seat, the
real winner can "inherit" the position.
PROTECTION AGAINST POSSIBLE FRAUD
It will be very difficult for a fraudulent official to bribe a large number of
jurors, because they will automatically oppose him and try to keep a low
profile (after all, they could get into trouble in the future). They will
initially be anonymous (the system will not disclose their information), so
they will be very reluctant to contact the fraudulent official. They will also
have no guarantee of payment from the official. The more jurors there are, the
more expensive and difficult it will be for the fraudulent official to exert
any significant pressure on the system.
Even if an illegitimate official becomes president and can print a lot of
money, it will be difficult for him to bribe jurors because: they will not
benefit from exposing themselves to him (they will automatically be his
enemies), they will not give him the passwords to their personal accounts
(otherwise, in the future, this will invalidate their votes in elections), and
therefore they will ultimately be able to vote in a way that benefits them,
even if they receive money from him for the "right decision."
A fraudulent official is unlikely to vote against themselves in advance in an
electronic voting system — it would further lower their approval rating, which
is extremely disadvantageous to them. Moreover, it's not free (voting is paid,
with each vote being subject to a fee). Predicting the future (that they will
be elected and a war against them) four to six years in advance is extremely
difficult. Therefore, the system will be protected, since jurors are drawn
only from past (old) votes.
No new votes will be held until the current target is eliminated — this will
protect against the selection of new sham jurors. The existing jurors, who are
clearly biased against the target, will always be used.
To protect against the possibility that a fraudulent official will request
video evidence of a "preferred juror's decision" for a fee, the system can be
configured to display a fake vote upon request. This way, the juror will earn
money and still vote as they wish.
IF A ROGUE OFFICIAL JAMS THE INTERNET IN A NON-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY
In this case, the external voting rule is used: the international community
(any country in the world) can participate in the election of any senior
official (president, governors, mayors, chief of the army, police, chief
justice, prosecutor) of a non-democratic country blocking the internet. In
exchange, each such country that votes grants the non-democratic country the
right to participate in the election of its top officials. All countries
participating in the external vote collectively have 50% of the 100% votes.
The remaining 50% of the votes belong to residents of the non-democratic
country, but due to the blocking of the external internet, they will not be
able to vote, meaning they will have no influence on the situation in other
normal countries.
To protect against voter fraud (when 10 people in a non-democratic country are
allowed internet access and supposedly "vote" for the entire country's
population and elect the president of a foreign country), a minimum turnout
threshold of 5-25% of the country's total population should be established. If
the number of voters is lower, the votes from that country are not counted.
This way, the system will remain functional and protected from the influence
of undemocratic scams. In an undemocratic country, the people of other
countries will begin electing officials, and they will be unable to do
anything in return.
Killers will have a harder time eliminating crooked officials in undemocratic
countries, but it will still be possible. The only question is the price
(there will always be corrupt officials among them who will sell out an
illegitimate figure for a good reward).
There will be few such countries (the rule will be rarely used). Few will dare
to completely block it, and even with partial blocking, Elon Musk's VPN and
satellite internet will still be able to reach the global international
internet.
WHAT IS THE INTEREST OF THE CREATOR OF THIS SYSTEM?
WHAT WILL THIS SYSTEM GIVE TO WESTERN COUNTRIES?
This system won't pose a threat to Western countries (they'll have protection
from it), but at the same time, top officials in non-democratic countries will
begin to change much more frequently, and they'll be much more willing and
active to cooperate with the international community. They won't violate its
rules. Western countries have deep pockets that can pay for the elimination of
leaders who try to deceive and rob their populations.
There will be no need to send troops into Venezuela, as this would, to some
extent, lower the US's global standing (and provoke some condemnation from
the global public). It will be possible to remotely eliminate individuals
who lack real public support.